Sino–American rapprochement in the early 1970s had a dramatic effect on the Korean Peninsula. Recently declassified US government documents shed new light on the importance of the ‘Korean question’ during secret talks held between the United States and China. This article contends that Sino–American rapprochement constituted a kind of ‘intermediate settlement’ of the Korean War and ultimately influenced the transformation of the ‘divided Korea system’.

Two primary factors in the Korean question confronted the United States and China in their talks for rapprochement.

1. The role of the US Army in South Korea
   Mutual understanding regarding the role of the US armed forces in Korea (USFK) was a precondition for US–China reconciliation. The USFK acted as a ‘deterrent’ against an attack from Chinese/North Korean armed forces during and after the Korean War, whereas China regarded the US military presence as a ‘threat’ to its own security. Consequently, it was necessary for the United States to convince China that the USFK was not intended for action against China. The newly agreed role of the USFK was a ‘stabilizer’, which was expected to keep the balance of power in Northeastern Asia, in particular by checking the potential expansionism of the Soviet Union and Japan. With China’s understanding of the USFK’s role and its continued deployment, the Nixon administration abandoned the plan of extending the Nixon Doctrine to South Korea.

2. The presence of the United Nations in the Korean Peninsula
   The United States and the United Nations designated China and North Korea as ‘belligerent parties’ in the Korean War. Sino–American rapprochement and the admission of China to the UN (China–UN rapprochement), however, fundamentally changed this structure of confrontation. China demanded in particular the dissolution of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK). Having been founded during the Korean War, UNCURK symbolized a claim that South Korea was the only legitimate government on the Korean Peninsula. Washington and Beijing agreed to abolish the UNCURK ‘quietly’ in the UN General Assembly in 1973. This suggested that the international community, including the United States and China, recognized ‘two antagonistic legitimate governments’ on the Korean Peninsula.

The driving force behind Sino–American co-operation for reframing the Korean question was the common interest in the stabilization of the divided Korea system. In retrospect, we can say that a new crisis management system emerged out of Sino–American rapprochement, which could be called the ‘Sino–American Concert of the Korean Peninsula’. From the point of view of the two Koreas, however, Sino–American joint engagement in the Korean question meant in effect the suspension of unification.
This article discusses two private railways built in Thailand in the 1890s and 1900s. It analyzes the attempts of these two lines to develop into urban railways, and explains why they eventually failed to do so.

The two private lines discussed are (i) the Paknam Railway, the first railway in Thailand, which opened in 1893 and connected Bangkok to the mouth of the Chao Phraya river at Paknam; and (ii) the Thachin Railway, connecting Bangkok to Thachin (Samut Sakhon), which opened in 1905 and was extended in 1907 to Maeklong (Samut Songkhram) and was thereafter named the Maeklong Railway.

Although initially both railways functioned as inter-city lines, by increasing their service frequency they soon began to serve functionally as intra-city or urban lines. The Paknam Railway introduced a motor-tramcar service within the Bangkok urban area in 1908, which was replaced in 1912 by an electric tramcar. A plan in the 1920s to electrify the entire line was discouraged by the government’s opposition to any extension of the concession period. Although the Paknam Railway was eventually electrified, its intra-city service was largely substituted by the newly extended tramline along it. The Maeklong line also began an electric tramcar service along one section to serve the Bangkok urban area, but global depression prevented it from realizing its full potential.

The Thai government, having no intention to renew the private railway concessions, instead purchased the lines outright at the end of the concession periods. However, state ownership resulted in little further investment in the lines. The Paknam line suffered in competition with road transport, and soon became a loss-making venture. The Maeklong line, in contrast, which did not suffer from direct road competition, witnessed an increase in traffic volume, but this enhanced its inter-city, rather than its intra-city, functions.

Prime Minister Sarit’s policy of ‘beauty’ brought the closure of the Paknam line in 1959. The Maeklong line also faced closure, but only one section was actually abandoned in the 1960s.

There are three reasons why these railways failed to become true urban railways. First, the government’s state-oriented railway policy exhibited excessive caution towards foreign investors. Second, the foreign investors that did exist restrained their investments, particularly in the final periods of their concessions, partly in reaction to government policy. Third, the government failed to recognize the potential of these railways to provide urban mass transport. As a result of these reasons, Bangkok failed to maintain urban railways and developed post-war along a path of automobile-dependency, a path that has brought numerous transport and environmental problems in its wake.
The ASEAN–China Free Trade Area and Investment Policy: The “Zou Chu Qu” Policy as the Driving Force behind the FTA

KUGA Yumi

Since the 1990s, economic cooperation in East Asia has become an increasingly important issue. In 2000, China, which is an important economic actor in the region, proposed the establishment of the ASEAN–China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) with the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). This was China’s first FTA. Given the acknowledged success of ASEAN in fostering economic cooperation, it is likely that ACFTA will become pivotal to East Asian economic cooperation.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the driving force behind ACFTA. In this paper, I would like to analyze ACFTA from the policy point of view, highlighting the China’s outward economic policy, termed “Zou Chu Qu”. This important policy, adopted since 1997, is aimed at promoting China’s outward investment. In particular, given that ASEAN countries are becoming an important region attracting much investment, I would like to describe the development of the “Zou Chu Qu” policy and the way it encourages Chinese enterprise to invest in ASEAN countries.

Many argue that ACFTA will increase trade and investment between China and ASEAN. However, the driving force behind ACFTA has not been described. It thus appears that it must be policy that drives the actual economy. The creation of the investment agreement in ACFTA was supposed to help China increase its investment toward ASEAN countries. However, it should be noted that ACFTA is a government-based policy and it is consequently necessary to promote cooperation between government and firms.

This paper shows that the “Zou Chu Qu” policy is the main driving force behind ACFTA. In particular, for example, at the ASEAN–China Expo—which is considered to herald a new phase of the policy—the Chinese government gives Chinese enterprises the opportunity to obtain directly valuable information relating to investment, investment environment and investment facilitation policies. Moreover, Chinese enterprises will have the opportunity to negotiate new investments with firms or governments in ASEAN countries. Taking the above-mentioned facts into account, the “Zou Chu Qu” policy is clearly a driving force behind ACFTA.
The Emergence of ‘Interpretive Community’ and ‘Ubiquitous Individuality’: A Case Study of Development Aid and the Badjaos in Davao City, Philippines

AOYAMA Waka

In this paper I have attempted to give an alternative view of the discrepancy between policy and practice in development aid projects by introducing two terms, ‘interpretive community’ and ‘ubiquitous individuality’, as key concepts. To examine the two concepts empirically, I have employed a case study of development aid targeted at the Badjaos in Davao City, Philippines. The data used for this study were collected through fieldwork.

The present paper is organized into three sections following the introduction. Section I sets the framework. It provides a brief review on the recent literature on the relations between policy and practice in development studies to introduce the two key terms. First, the term ‘interpretive community’ proposed by David Mosse, a British anthropologist, is shown to explain why the highly controlled management of aid donors at the upstream of the development industry paradoxically results in creating space for downstream actors such as local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) to exercise their own autonomy in hidden manners. Second, in order to have a proper human model to match the concept of the interpretive community, the term ‘ubiquitous individuality’ coined by Motoji Matsuda, a Kyoto University professor, is applied. It is intended to overcome the donors’ strict monitoring (the theoretical ‘black box’) of the interactions between individuals and communities. Aid donors tend to methodically omit cultural and historical contexts of individuality in their client areas that are not considered pertinent to Western ideas of individuality (considered universal by the donor agencies). ‘Ubiquitous individuality’ thereby aims to uncover the existence of individuality in non-Western societies with varieties and limitations innate to their own historical and cultural contexts. This new human model enables the author to depict the process in which certain individuals appear out of the underprivileged sector to demonstrate their commitment to form the interpretive community in the face of the highly controlled management of aid donors.

Section II compares the results of the 2006 questionnaire survey of all households (183 in total) in the research site and those of the previous survey in 1998–1999. The quantitative analysis shows that despite the aid projects delivered by five religious missions/NGOs, one local NGO and two government-related agencies since 2000, only limited improvement in the living conditions could be seen. In the previous survey both non-Badjaos and Badjaos themselves had claimed that the Badjaos would need adequate education and skills training, and gainful livelihoods to improve their situation. However, the latest survey confirms that there was no significant improvement in the level of educational attainment among the Badjaos, who therefore still lacked the means to participate in the urban labor market. Likewise, there had been no substantial changes in their standard of living, which was measured by economic indices such as income, possessions of durable goods, and housing conditions.

Section III provides a descriptive analysis of the emergence of the interpretive community and ubiquitous individuality in the research site. First, it examines the nature of the goods and services brought by the missionaries and NGOs as aid. Regardless of the aid agency, this aid tended to concentrate on free food, free medication, seasonal gifts and free daycare centers for preschoolers. In other words, few resources had been directed to empower the Badjaos through education and
work in the long run. On the other hand, even though their aid activities appeared to have clearly failed in terms of socioeconomic indicators, it appears unlikely that these agencies will quit. To explain this paradoxical situation, this section also provides an insight into the hidden exchanges between the middlemen who represented the Badjao community and the aid agencies. Specifically it focuses on two actors, a Badjao pastor and a Cebuano NGO officer. Both of these individuals were apparently acting to measure up to the “formal” agenda of the aid agencies while tactfully trading what the aid agencies really wanted (such as reputation, more converts, etc.) for the resources actually needed to deliver on their commitments to the community.

The major implication derived from this study is the need to have an alternative view in development studies. No matter how hard the aid donors may attempt to design the plans to apparently improve the lives of others through highly sophisticated monitoring and management, the discrepancy between the policy and practice in aid projects will not be solved unless they undertake serious self-reflection on the rational human model they are based on, at ground level. People in non-Western societies do have their own individuality, which dynamically reveals itself in each historical and cultural context. Accordingly, they create their own space for autonomy, which the donor agencies may not be aware of.
編集後記

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（高橋伸夫）

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