SUMMARY
Symbols in the Chinese Communist Base Areas during the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War Period
— The National Flag and Portraits of Leaders —

Takashi MARUTA

This essay examines the manipulation of symbols in the Chinese Communist base areas during the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War period. It concentrates on the relationship between the National United Front and the state, and examines how folk customs were used to carry the party message into rural areas.

During the early part of the Anti-Japanese War, in the Shan-Gan-Ning border region the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sought to explain the new relation between state and party, and the introduction of the new flag of the Nationalist Government was delayed. Instead, the CCP adopted a pattern that symbolized the Second United Front between the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) and the CCP by the respective party flags and portraits of Jiang Jieshi and Mao Zedong. During the Anti-Japanese War and Civil War period, the national flag was actively used as an important symbol that signified the legitimacy of the political power of the Chinese Communist base areas within the framework of the Republic of China and the United Front. After relations between the Nationalists and Communists deteriorated, the national flag was also used to symbolize the political power of the CCP as the legitimate party of republican China. However, the institutionalization of the use of the national flag and its penetration to the grass roots were limited, because the flag was also the symbol of the ‘party state’. The portrait of Sun Zhongshan had played a similar role, and after the rectification movement that established Mao Zedong as the ideological leader of the CCP, the portrait of Mao Zedong emerged as the pre-eminent symbol of the Chinese Communist base areas. Mao’s position as legitimate national leader was also emphasized by the use of his portrait with the national flag and so on.

In addition, from the end of 1944 to the land reform period, the portrait of Mao Zedong was used as a substitute for the figures of gods in the Taihang and Taiyue Base Area, by adapting the rites of individual households or village rituals. In this way, the CCP tried to infiltrate its authority into this unstable base area via folk customs and religious ritual. The use of Mao’s portrait also followed the form of folk religion in which peasants honored gods that they believed brought wealth to the household, and portraits of Mao Zedong were given the favored position of the god that controlled domestic prosperity. The portrait of Mao Zedong, the use of which spread among like-thinking people, was nevertheless not a rigid symbol as it also signified the dignity of the nation and the political power of the CCP. The worship of Mao Zedong that the CCP promoted was not one that could be rooted in villages simply via a shared peasant mentality, like Ralph Thaxton’s image, but one that could be only achieved by infiltrating folk religion.
SUMMARY

A Reconsideration of the ‘Ho–Umezu Agreement’
— With a Focus on the Sino-Japanese Relationship —

Naotaka UCHIDA

The comparative analysis used in this paper examines material from both China and Japan to clarify the negotiation process of the so-called ‘Ho–Umezu Agreement’ and the many serious problems that complicated Sino-Japanese relations thereafter. In 1935 Minister Ho Ying-ch’în was China’s Minister of War and headed the Peiping Branch of the Military Affairs Commission. Takashi Sakai was Chief-of-Staff of Japan’s North China Garrison. The Ho–Umezu Agreement is complicated by the fact that it involves both the verbal understanding reached on 10 June 1935 between Ho and Sakai and the personal letter written by Ho on 6 July, in which Ho notified Yoshijiro Umezu, commander of Japan’s North China Garrison, that China would comply voluntarily with Japan’s demands.

It is already known that Japan presented its demands to China because of the Tientsin Incident, which occurred in the Japanese Concession, and the Sun Yung-ch’în Army Incident, which occurred in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as determined by the Tangku Truce. However, as this paper clarifies, for the first time, the Chinese and Japanese front lines were involved in conflict-ridden negotiations over which security forces should be stationed in the DMZ. Moreover the Japanese were deeply involved in smuggling in this zone.

It was the Kwantung Army, not the North China Garrison at Tientsin, that judged the Tientsin Incident in the Japanese Concession to be a very grave incident and subsequently fabricated a pretext for presenting demands to China.

On 29 May, Takashi Sakai, representing the North China Garrison of Tientsin, together with Dan Takahashi, the Japanese military attaché at Peiping, representing the Kwangtung Army, visited Minister Ho Ying-ch’în at Chüjentang. These Sino-Japanese negotiations began at Peiping, and it was here that Japan demanded an end to the Nationalist Party’s authority in Huapei. One especially difficult demand placed on the Chinese was Japan’s insistence on the removal of the Central Army from Hopei. Chiang Kai-shek received a telegram from Peiping notifying him of this demand. Chiang understood the Japanese motives behind this demand and strongly opposed the withdrawal of the Central Army, because he realized it would mean that the Central Army would relinquish Huapei to the Japanese. However, Ho and Wang ching-wei, the President of the Executive Yuan, appealed to Chiang, pleading that a refusal of Japan’s demands would mean the beginning of war in Huapei in circumstances particularly unfavorable to the Chinese at that time. They persuaded Chiang to accept the withdrawal demand; after that, Ho verbally accepted all of Japanese demands.

However, Takahashi made a series of requests for a formal signing of the memorandum, but Ho refused and left Peiping for Nanking. Minister Ho ultimately sent a letter to Umezu notifying him that China would voluntarily comply with the Japanese demands. However, from that point on the Nationalist government leaders denied the existence of this agreement, which was, in effect, different from the Tangku Truce, which had been signed in 1933.

The Nationalist government attempted to resolve the issue of Japan’s demands by diplomatic negotiation, but Hirota Koki, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, told the Chinese ambassador that because this matter involved military affairs concerning the Tangku Truce, it should be negotiated with the army in the field. Thus, Hirota closed the door on resolution through official
diplomatic channels. Furthermore, this policy adjustment between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Army and the General Staff Office had grave consequences because it extended the area covered by the Tangku Truce to the Peiping–Tientsin area. At the same time, Tokyo made a point of emphasizing the role of the army in the field, especially that of the Tientsin North China Garrison in Huapei. Ultimately, Huapei’s problems were not resolved by official diplomatic negotiation.

Two years later, after the Lukouch’iao Incident, Japan clashed with China about the interpretation of the Ho–Umezu Agreement, and this clash resulted in the breakdown of negotiations. The Ho–Umezu Agreement and the Tangku Truce were crucial steps on the road to the ensuing all-out war between China and Japan because they provided Japan’s field armies with a legal basis for taking action in North China.

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**SUMMARY**

Integration under ‘One Country, Two Systems’
— The Case of Mainland China and Hong Kong —

Takayuki TAKEUCHI

This article analyzes integration under ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in terms of the theory of international integration. The handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was an incomplete unification: apart from the replacement of its suzerain state, only a few changes were made to Hong Kong’s existing domestic system and international status. The PRC government emphasized the separation of Hong Kong and Mainland China, and other countries made the same distinction. However, this was not a constructive approach given that regionalism was on the increase in East Asia.

Under ‘One Country, Two Systems’, Hong Kong seems to enjoy wide autonomy, and can belong to international economic and social organizations. However, this autonomy is strictly limited to the political field. Furthermore, Hong Kong does not share any part of the sovereignty of the PRC. Should Hong Kong ever acquire complete autonomy, its status will closely resemble the former Yugoslavia’s federal system in which states enjoyed ‘economic sovereignty’, and some became independent. Therefore, the PRC government has little incentive to invest in Hong Kong’s economic or political ‘autonomy’ (or democratization).

Hong Kong and Mainland China have already concluded the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). This is a kind of free trade agreement (FTA) and functions at the primary level of economic integration. Although World Trade Organization rules do not prohibit FTAs between territories and their mainlands (or suzerain states), any wishes that the Hong Kong people might have are not relevant in terms of international integration theory. After the Asian economic crisis, the PRC government had considered an FTA with Hong Kong. However, at that time, Hong Kong had no interest in such an FTA, and so the PRC abandoned this plan. Although Hong Kong has no popular democratic process to ratify the wishes of its people, the CEPA was proposed by the Hong Kong SAR and not forced upon it by the PRC government.

The PRC government is careful to maintain equality via an economic corporation between
Hong Kong and Mainland China. Most of the schemes under the aegis of this economic corporation were initiated by the Hong Kong SAR and Guangdong Province, and the PRC government only observed and assisted them until 1999. After the late 1990s, East Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan began to consider an FTA. In Hong Kong, the bureaucrats opposed such an agreement. However, Taiwan proposed an FTA to the PRC government, and the PRC itself soon proposed an FTA with the ASEAN countries. Although the PRC’s proposal was similar to Singapore’s proposal on ASEAN+3 as a means for East Asian economic integration, the China–ASEAN FTA also became a priority. The PRC government — sensitive to the issue of Taiwan’s political status even as an FTA member — thus had to consider how to let Hong Kong join the East Asian FTA.

This paper also analyzes the degree of integration, which could either deepen or be restricted under ‘One Country, Two Systems’. The introduction of a single currency, the establishment of an integrated central bank, and fiscal integration are prevented by the Hong Kong SAR Basic Law. However, there is another model of monetary union, the reciprocal circulation of the currencies, which does not conflict with the Basic Law. Hence, monetary union would be possible among the PRC territories, with the renminbi (the currency of the PRC) as the hard currency. Most obstructions to economic integration stem from the difference in economic level between Hong Kong and Mainland China. The establishment of a custom unions and complete freedom of movement — as done by the Schengen Convention in Europe — may be impossible in the near future.

The problems for the present are transparency with a special focus on integration. CEPA, as the alternative to the PRC’s preferential treatment for enterprises with foreign capital, reflects the requirements of business. However, the Hong Kong government tends to ignore its citizens’ interests, as exemplified by its plan or a ‘Land and Sea Departure Tax’. Furthermore, the Hong Kong government continues to neglect social policy for Hong Kong citizens working or living in Mainland China.

Hence, this paper concludes that the development of democracy and autonomy in Hong Kong is indispensable to maintaining ‘One Country, Two Systems’ and transparency along with economic integration.

**SUMMARY**

The Rayon Spinning Industry and the Textile Industry in Colonial Korea, 1940–1945

Masaaki FUKUOKA

This paper describes some research into changes in the rayon industry in Korea between 1940 and 1945.

In the 1930s the Korean rayon industry experienced an marked imbalance of production between the textile production and dyeing sectors. Rayon material was therefore imported from Japan, and the dyeing processing was given priority to redress this situation. However, in the 1940s the transfer of power looms from Japan resulted in an increase in textile production. In 1941 there was a large stock of rayon yarn in Korea. In that year Dainihon Boseki began
rayon spinning operations in Chonjing, in northern Korea, and with the outbreak of World War II, Korea lost its US silk yarn market, and was left with increasing stocks of silk. Thus in the 1940s the acquisition of production facilities and an abundance of textile material brought rapid growth to the Korean textile industry, and removed the imbalance of productive capacity between the textile production and dyeing sectors.

After the war, Korea, liberated from Japanese colonization, saw an increase in rayon production, and increased demand for this textile. Until the Korean War broke out in 1950, the country’s textile industry enjoyed more prosperity than during the period of colonization. Hence the development of the Korean rayon industry after the liberation began in the first half of the 1940s.

SUMMARY

Interlocking Directorships in Hong Kong

Misuzu UEHARA

This paper presents the results of some research on the network of interlocking directorships in Hong Kong. ‘Interlocking directorship’ is the name given to the relationship between enterprises when one person is a member of the board of two or more companies. Such a person is termed a ‘multiple director’. These two concepts are central to the thesis of this paper.

This paper applies to companies listed on the Hang Seng Index. The Hang Seng Index is a barometer of the Hong Kong stock market. The Hang Seng Index comprises 33 stocks, which are representative of the market.

Most researchers have drawn their hypotheses from a limited number of theoretical models. Five main models have guided their inferences about the significance of interlocking directorships: (1) the managerial model; (2) the resource-dependence model; (3) the class-cohesion model; (4) the bank-control model; and (5) the finance-capital model. In order to approach the question of how to infer the significance of interlocking directorships, it is necessary to review briefly the central tenets of each model.

(1) The managerial model

This model is based on a view of the firm that holds that the larger and more prestigious enterprises have chief executives who are in great demand by other enterprises and that such companies will, therefore, have a large number of interlocking directorships.

(2) The resource-dependence model

According to this model, large enterprises depend upon one another for access to valued resources and therefore seek to establish links in an attempt to regulate their interdependence. The network of interlocking directorships should have no systematic structure. It should consist of dyads, triads and other communities of interest that are perhaps linked to one another through a sparse nexus of random interlocking directorships. This model predicts that there would be many multiple interlocking directorships between enterprises.

(3) The class-cohesion model

This model holds that directors are recruited from an élite and that the patterns of interlocking directorships express and contribute to the cohesion of this class. Directors have a com-
mon educational background and are associated with clubs and educational bodies.

(4) The bank-control model

This model depicts banks as having an independent power base because of the level of their shareholdings and because of their ability to grant or to withhold long- and short-term loans. Banks seek board representation on those companies whose affairs they wish to control, and the network both expresses and effects this control. In this way, banks build up interest groups subject to co-ordination or control by themselves. The bank subordinates the interests of the various corporations to a common strategy aimed at maximizing its own interests. Banks should be centrally placed in a network of directional interlocking directorships.

(5) The finance-capital model

The concentration of banking and industry leads to their fusion into the monopoly form of money capital. Banks and insurance companies should be the organizing pivots of the structure and there should be a division of the network into relatively distinct clusters around these companies. These clusters may perhaps be identified by the existence of multiple interlocking directorships between companies.

Empirical analysis of the Hang Seng companies shows that foreign enterprises tended to be isolated or loosely connected with domestic companies. Of the 33 large companies, 30 were interlocked and linked to, on average, four enterprises. A small number of multiple directors belonged to the same organization. The resource-dependence model and the class-cohesion model may be combined to explain the structures found in Hong Kong. The network between corporations offers strong possibilities for sharing information.
編集後記

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