If in the future disintegration does happen in the Republic of Indonesia, the states most likely to separate from Indonesia are Aceh (the most western province) and Papua (the most eastern province). Such development has come under the calculation of the central government since the downfall of the Soeharto regime. The government for some time has been making preparations to formulate autonomy plans for the two states in an effort to prevent the disintegration from happening. But despite the government’s endeavor, the Aceh and Papua communities seem still discontented. This can be seen from the fact that they still keep on demanding a referendum. As a democratic country, the government cannot turn down such demands, and one day will have to accept the demand for a referendum to let the people of the two provinces vote for their futures.

Certainly the way to referendums is not going to be smooth, as there are a number of politicians and security personnel who are worried that such a move will become a precedent for other provinces that might seek to ask for separation. The central government does not want to see Indonesia break up into many small countries. Nevertheless, according to my view, the possibility of such a national split is not high, as Aceh and Papua have a different historical background from that of the other provinces.

Concerning Aceh, first, if we look back on history, the Aceh community never surrendered authority to the Dutch government. Therefore, it can be regarded that Aceh joined the Republic of Indonesia in 1945 when Indonesia proclaimed independence from the Dutch government. Second, most of the Aceh people called themselves the nation of Aceh, though all races in Indonesia did commit to use the name “Bangsa Indonesia” as what was sworn in the Indonesia Youth Congress on October 28, 1928. From here we can see the fact that Aceh nationalism is deeply rooted in the Aceh people, who always want to distinguish themselves from the other races in the country. Third, the Aceh community has long been under the supervision of the central government because of the separatist movement by a group of armed men calling themselves activists of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). The central government has located a combat troop in the province to fight the GAM activists. As a result, many people in Aceh have become victims, with uncounted loss of lives and property during the long fighting between the government armed forces (TNI) and the GAM troops. No wonder the families of the victims bear a grudge toward the presence of the government troops, who are regarded to have been overacting in their operation that has killed many innocent lives. The TNI in many ways has ignored human rights in Aceh, and the rule of law has not been fully implemented throughout the country by the government. Based on the above three reasons, we should have no wonder why most of the people of Aceh seek an opportunity to become independent from the Republic of Indonesia.

In the case of Papua, the historical background of the region is also different from that of other parts of Indonesia. First, the community in Papua did not take part in the independence struggle against the Dutch colonial government. When Indonesia became independent from
the Dutch, Papua was still under the rule of the colonial government. Second, some Indonesian national leaders did not agree on the inclusion of Papua into the Indonesian territory, as Papua people are of a race of Melanesia that is different from the majority of Indonesians, who are mostly Mongoloid (paleo-Mongoloid). Third, before Papua was integrated with Indonesia, Papua nationalism had developed in the Papua community. Under the recognition of the Dutch government, the Papua people had decided their country’s name (Papua Barat), their nation’s name (Bangsa Papua), their national flag (Bintang Kejora), and their national anthem (Hai Tanahku Papua) in October 1961. On December 1, 1961, the Papua national flag was flying over the territory, and the national anthem was sung by the Papua community. Fourth, the result of the Pepera (act of free choice), which was held under the supervision of the United Nations in 1969, was in fact not accepted by the Papua community at the beginning, because it was suspected that Indonesia had engineered the voting in the Pepera. Consequently such rejection has been going on to the present day. Fifth, there has been a separatist movement by certain armed groups against the central government, called the Organisasi Papua Merdeka. As happened in Aceh, during the clash between the government army and the armed separatists, many innocent lives and property have been lost owing to the overacting of the army, who in many cases have offended the human rights of the Papua people but are free from being accused for their misdoings. From the above facts, we can understand that the Papua community has gradually lost its confidence in the government’s security personals.

There might also be other factors behind separatism in Aceh and Papua, such as the economy and transmigration, but these are not the main ones, because other provinces that resemble Aceh and Papua in natural resources (such as Riau and East Kalimantan) have not developed intentions to separate. In Lampung, which has become the most popular place of transmigration, there is no such high demand for separatism as in Aceh and Papua. I am sure that there are other provinces that will prefer to remain integrated in Indonesia in view of the benefits they achieve through integration, as well as their historical background and existing conditions.

SUMMARY

Kashmir: On the Edge of State Formation

Chiharu TAKENAKA

Kashmir has been a battleground for India and Pakistan for more than five decades. Besides frequent skirmishes, they fought three major wars and the Kargil War in 1999 at the risk of nuclear confrontation. The leaders of both countries seem to be determined to keep fighting in this remote Himalayan range. Why are they fighting there? For what?

It is commonly said that Kashmir is too crucial for one of them to lose to the other. In this paper, however, I argue that the opposite is the case. Kashmir has never been central to the state and society of the two countries but has always been located in a remote marginal place, called the “border” or “frontier.” Even when government officials say that “Kashmir is an integral part of” India or Pakistan, they hardly ever say that the “Kashmiri people are essential to our society.” It is the territory, but not the people, that matters in Kashmir. This
explains why this region has been left violent for such a long time. When was this marginality of Kashmir founded?

The “Kashmir problem” was nurtured by the British imperial policies in the nineteenth century to deal with the rapidly acquired territories northwest of Delhi, spreading into Afghanistan and Persia. Introducing a system of indirect rule, the Maharaja was picked up as a collaborator in charge of the newly established Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1847. The expansion of Russian influence in Central Asia in the 1870-80s led the British strategists to focus on the “frontier” in order to defend British interests in India. Kashmir, linking British India through Ghazni to Kandahar, gained renewed strategic attention. The Chinese approach to Ladakh strengthened this tendency eastward.

The empire needed a “border” or “frontier” to function as a “buffer zone” in front of the other imperial power. When the British needed a clear-cut demarcation of territory, they drew the line forcefully. But when it was better to keep the space open, they bribed and armed “independent” kings or tribal chiefs. The imperial map, therefore, left the delimitation of peripheral land, such as Kashmir, deliberately ambiguous. At the time of the British withdrawal, nationalists in India and Pakistan succeeded to this territorial concern of the imperialists. But the “frontier” of the colonial state had to be divided by boundaries, inch by inch, between the emerging nation-states based on the different principles of national integration. They disagreed and went to war. The history of Kashmir since 1947 and the Kashmiri people’s cry for freedom tell us the cruel juxtaposition of postcolonial nationalism.

SUMMARY

From “Minority Ethnic Groups” to “National Citizens”
—The Unification Process in Modern China—

WANG Ke

This paper is a historical analysis of government policies on minority ethnic groups in the People’s Republic of China. In the earlier days of the nation’s establishment, issues related to ethnic minorities were put in one political category, but not by class. The reason for such categorization was to materialize “equality among ethnic groups.” After the “class theory” arose in 1956, however, “social reform” was enforced in the ethnic minority group regions. While this was meant to stimulate development among ethnic minorities, they instead demonstrated opposition to promoting “socialistic nations,” which to them meant “ethnic unification.”

After the Cultural Revolution, the government compensated the ethnic minorities by offering various preferential treatment. This treatment, however, resulted in creating opposing structures of “China” against “ethnic minority groups.”

In the late 1990s economic development advanced in the ethnic minority regions with expectations that common economic systems and markets would strengthen the national identity of the ethnic minorities. By this change, China stepped into a post-“ethnic minority” era aiming for the establishment of “national citizens.”
This manuscript focuses on Ratchadamnoen Road development (August 1899–January 1903) in the Rama V era and demonstrates that the Privy Purse Bureau, the organization that administered and invested the king’s private fund, gathered large-scale land through this road development. The historical material I used mainly was the “R. 5 Kh. 4/3” file that has been possessed by the National Archives of Thailand.

Ratchadamnoen Road was planned as a Dusit Project. It was also developed as an avenue 58m in width and a “construction site” 35m one side to enhance national prestige. Although Nork Road and Klang Road were the same as Ratchadamnoen Road, the system of gathering land was different between both roads. Due to this, the role of the Privy Purse Bureau also changed naturally. The system of gathering land of Nork Road was buying and selling back. On the other hand, that of Klang Road was buying and subdivision.

The system of buying and selling back at Nork Road was as follows. First the government bought planned land for the roads and constructed the body of the roads. Then the government made old landowners living along the “construction site” pay the cost of development, not only that of road construction but also the total, including compensation. The system of selling back was that the government sold back the land at the total cost of gathering the land and road construction. So the system was that the government made landowners pay the cost of construction after all. The government was, so to speak, just a constructor. However, the biggest landowner who paid the cost of construction was the Privy Purse Bureau, or Rama V himself. That is why the Privy Purse Bureau constructed Nork Road, offered the king’s own land and privy purse money, which was the king’s private fund, and appropriated for the construction fund. After the roads’ completion, Rama V secured his own land along the roads again as reward by the system of selling back. Owing to this the Privy Purse Bureau monopolized the land along the roads, except for those of temples.

The construction of Klang Road was quite different from that of Nork Road in terms of the land situation. The number of landowners along Klang Road was five times as many as that of Nork Road. Also, the types of landowner were complex. And the worst thing was that the Privy Purse Bureau owned only 5.9% of the whole land. The Privy Purse Bureau could hardly get land by the selling-back system for old landowners. It was the system of buying and subdivision that the Privy Purse Bureau thought up under this situation. The system was as follows. First the Privy Purse Bureau bought land by funds of the Ministry of Finance and constructed roads. Then the bureau subdivided the “construction site” along both sides of the roads and made a profit. The aim of the Klang Road’s construction from the beginning was profit by subdivision of “construction site.” The Privy Purse Bureau got the right of getting land equal to subdivision profit of the “construction site” for free by negotiation with the Ministry of Finance. The right was reward for the Privy Pursue Bureau that offered the Ministry of Finance its own land. In fact, the Privy Purse Bureau offered the Ministry of Finance 7,476 square meters of land and got 16,168 square meters of land equal to subdivision profit as a reward.
In the above way, the Privy Purse Bureau gathered more than 48,000 square meters of land along the roads if the lands was underestimated through the development of Ratchadamnoen Road. The roads’ development and gathering lands in the early twentieth century have become the factors to decide the urbanization and redevelopment of this area after that.

SUMMARY

Contest for Citizenship and Collective Violence in China’s Cultural Revolution
—An Institutional Approach—

YANG Lijun

Faction/group formation, change, reorganization, and escalation of collective violence were the major characteristics threading through the Cultural Revolution at its peak from 1966 to 1969. How can these phenomena be explained? Existing theories have failed to provide an adequate explanation. While some scholars have focused on the role of the state/leadership leading to collective violent behavior, others have placed emphasis on factions/groups. This article attempts to develop an institutional approach to the phenomenon. It argues that the Cultural Revolution was a social movement through which different social groups/factions contested for “citizenship,” which was defined by the state, and that collective violence was a product of the interaction between the state and social groups. The author aims to explain why and how the institutional arrangement (space structure) between the state and society resulted in collective violence.

The author argues that since the state/leadership established the institutional framework in which social groups/factions contested for their citizenship, changes within the state/leadership not only provided social groups/factions opportunities to pursue their interests (different components of “citizenship”) but also created group/faction dynamics that led to the rise and fall of groups/factions. Furthermore, the elimination of private space and the politicization of public space before the Cultural Revolution left no space for those groups/factions, which wanted to protect and compete for more interests, to “exit” from public space. The interaction between groups/factions, as well as between groups/factions and the state/leadership, thus became so intensified that violence inevitably followed.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part provides a literature review on some major previous approaches to the Cultural Revolution and shows why these approaches are inadequate in explaining violent behavior during the movement. In the second part, I set up my own analytic framework and explain why such an institutional approach can explain the phenomenon better. And in the third part, I apply this institutional approach to explain how the interaction between the state and social groups/factions led to violent behavior.