The most salient feature of Myanmar’s contemporary history is the perennial insurrections by the world’s largest number of rebellious ethnic groups and communists. Starting immediately after independence (or more correctly, after regaining independence), these insurrections, together with non-citizen ethnic elements in the economic activities, have been the source of incessant threats to Myanmar’s national security and the people’s welfare. The hostilities are more exogenous than endogenous in origin and were exacerbated by “foreign covert interventions” during the cold-war period. These anti-central government struggles were secretly supported and instigated from abroad as a part of the cold-war strategy. All these factors continued to hinder Myanmar’s national integration and the consolidation of its national economy during the post-independence period.

However, historians’ views differ drastically in the recognition of these facts. This is reflected in their contradicting assessments of Myanmar’s political tradition and the recent democratization efforts. Some scholars believe that the “liberal democracy” introduced by the British colonial rule and “internalized” during the U Nu period could be revived if the National League for Democracy, the winner of the 1990 election, were given power. They neglect foreign interventions. Others assert that what Myanmar needed since its independence is a “cohesive and united” state instead of a “liberal and individualistic” one, but it has been severely affected by “foreign covert activities,” such as those by the Kuomintang (KMT). They do not regard the 1990 election as expressing “true” public opinion. It was penetrated by old leftists and former military men ousted by Ne Win.

This article, basically sharing the latter view, tries to trace some historical facts contained in official records of the U.S. government and Congress relating to Myanmar. Continual covert operations, particularly the ones carried out in connection with the wars in Laos, endangered Myanmar’s national security and invited the 1962 coup d’état. The policy of secret intervention regarded the rebellious ethnic groups as “reliable, pro-western and democratic elements” and gave them various supports but connived their “opium industry.” Certain interventionist activities were also conducted during the 1988–89 period with the intention of replacing the central government. The military’s perception of an imminent crisis obliged it to launch another coup d’état in 1988. As the cold-war neared its end, bringing a conceptual change in the political dogma and tactical trappings, a dilemma, hitherto neglected in the secret policy, emerged to the front vis-à-vis the “opium economy” of the insurgent groups. Some records indicate that this dilemma was behind the attempted replacement of government.

Against this historical background, the article concludes that, in Myanmar, what may be called a national integration paradigm and a democratization paradigm are closely interrelated. A meaningful democratization cannot be realized without a breakthrough in the national integration process. The illegal economy of the ethnic groups of the “border areas” should be normalized and a workable political delegation system should be established for
them by replacing weapons by ballots. Thus, a proper border areas development program would be a prerequisite for a feasible democratization in Myanmar. This would require effective foreign assistance instead of interventionist sanctions.

These processes would become possible only when all the parties concerned attain reconciliation and resolve the enmity among themselves through joint efforts for a shared recognition of the political truth about the modern history of Myanmar, a truth that has so long been blurred and distorted by the secrecy of the “covert intervention.”

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**SUMMARY**

**The Tripartite Partnership Among State Reformists, NGOs, and People’s Organizations in Land Reform in the Philippines**

—A Case Study of Brgy Mabato, Laguna—

Yoshie Hori

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The Philippines is a predominantly agrarian society with a highly skewed landownership distribution. Its agrarian structure and political institutions are more akin to Latin American countries than to its Asian neighbors.

This paper focuses on the local-level perspective to land reform implementation. It presents a local case study of the People’s Organization (PO) at Barangay (village) Mabato, Laguna, where agrarian reform was successfully implemented despite strong opposition from the landlords. The role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the government in this political movement is also analyzed.

The paper is composed of seven parts. The first is an introductory section dealing with the definition of the POs and NGOs and concepts related to the relations among the POs, NGOs, and the government in land reform in the Philippines. The second section addresses the outline and several problems of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) enacted in June 1988. The third section investigates the tripartite partnership among state reformists, some NGOs, such as PhilDHRRRA and PAKISAMA, and POs. This has been establishing since the Aquino regime. This is the social background of Brgy Mabato’s case. The fourth section turns its focus on Brgy Mabato. It shows the history of Brgy Mabato in terms of the landlord-tenant relationship. The fifth section examines how people at Brgy Mabato organized the PO, how they acted, how this case developed, and how they could finally get the land. The sixth section investigates the role of NGOs and pro-reformists at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in this case. It probes how the NGOs provided the opportunity to organize the PO and the NGO support in terms of knowledge and strategies for implementation of land reform. Moreover, the NGOs served to bridge the gap between the PO at Brgy Mabato and the government. The pro-reform initiatives at the DAR could also contribute to the implementation of land reform at Brgy Mabato. Finally, the paper ends with a summary of the above discussions. This research concludes that land reform can be
implemented in politically disadvantaged settings for tenants when positive interaction occurs between people from the PO and NGOs and pro-reform initiatives from the DAR.

SUMMARY

The Changing Landholding Structure and Image of the Landlord in Green Revolution Areas
—The Case of Punjab, India—

Daizo SUGIMOTO

The Green Revolution in Punjab, which started in the late 1960s, has not only led to a phenomenal increase in agricultural output but also induced substantial changes in the landholding structure. The purpose of this essay is to investigate how the changes in farm management caused by the Green Revolution have affected the landholding structure using data obtained from the National Sample Survey (NSS) and Farm Accounts in Punjab.

Modern agricultural technologies, which consist of the seed-fertiliser-irrigation technology and the use of agricultural machinery, and the various agricultural policies that kept the price of agricultural output remunerable have had two important effects on farm management in Punjab. One is an increase in agricultural income per acre, and the other is a reduction of technological constraints on intensive operation of large farmland.

The transformation in farm management has had an influence on the landholding structure in two ways. First, mainly due to the rise in agricultural income per acre, the proportion of marginal and small holdings to the total number of holdings has increased. Second, since the labour-saving technology enabled farmers to seek more profit on larger land, some farmers, mostly vested ones, expanded their holding size. In the socioeconomic context of Punjab, farmers have two means to do so. One is the resumption of farming on leased-out land. Landlords have ousted tenants from their leased-out land and launched farming there. This process can be observed in the NSS data. The proportion of leased-in land to the total area of operational holding continuously decreased from the 1960s to the 1970s. Another way to expand the holding size is to lease-in land. The leased-in share of total landholding area operated by big farmers increased substantially in the 1980s. The new phenomena of leasing-in land by big farmers in the 1980s could be attributed to the fact that the resumable land owned by the big landlord had reached a limit, and they began to launch the expansion of holdings by leasing-in land.

Important changes occurred in the image of landlords, too. The share of medium and small landowners to the total area of leased-out land went up while that of big landowners decreased in the 1980s. This tendency is coincident with the explanation above that big landlords had almost finished resuming farming on their leased-out land by the end of the 1980s. The departure from the past trend appears not only in the class of land ownership but also in the characteristics of landlord households. The micro data of the NSS collected in 1991–92 is considerably useful in investigating this point. The data contains detailed
information, such as the occupational structure, number, and educational status of family members. Based on this material, landlords can be classified into four types: (a) the landlord who does not engage in farming and mostly depends on income from rent, (b) the landlord who engages in farming and does not have any other work, (c) the landlord who engages not in farming but in some other nonagricultural occupation, and (d) the landlord who engages both in farming and in nonagricultural occupation. Among the four types of landlord, the latter two types, who diversify their occupational structure toward the nonagricultural sector, seem to bear important meaning for the evolution of the Punjab economy, because they suggest a way for the farmers to stop farming and leave the agricultural sector. In this sense, the transformation of the landholding structure in the state will depend on the expansion of the nonagricultural sector as well as the profitability of the agricultural sector.

The purpose of this paper is to propose an argument on the methodological approaches used to study the Korean-Chinese community. Specifically, the purpose is to advance a new approach to explore the state of their community. A study of the Korean-Chinese community needs further research, but here I limit the discussion to methodological approaches. Consequently, I am not concerned here with the actual situation of the Korean-Chinese community due to a limitation of space. This is the reason why this paper is entitled “An Introduction to the Study of the Korean-Chinese Community.”

The Korean-Chinese community has a population of about two million, which is the largest population among Korean communities overseas. Koreans who originally settled in China, particularly in the northeastern region that became Manchuria, in the late nineteenth century have maintained their ethnic identity generation after generation, even with the profound social and political changes that have occurred over the past hundred years. With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Koreans in China were given the legal rights as both Chinese and as an ethnic minority in China, a.k.a. “Chosonzok,” and they have lived as Korean-Chinese for half a century. In effect, Korean-Chinese are characterized both by their Korean ethnic and their Chinese national identities.

Numerous attempts have been made by scholars to describe Korean-Chinese communities and their unique identity. In particular, in Yanbian (a self-governed province by Koreans) hundreds of published volumes attempt to describe these communities’ identity. In addition, various studies have begun over the last few years in Japan within this field. For instance, a
series on contemporary China (XXXVII) entitled “The Ethnic Relationship to Korean-Chinese” (Chugoku Chosenzoku no Minzokukankei) written by Chog Ayong was issued by the Japan Association for Asian Political and Economic Studies (Azia Seikei Gakkai) last year. These previous studies have their own approaches. To my knowledge, however, no study has examined the argument of ideas concerning “methodology” itself.

For the purpose of this paper, I began by surveying previous studies and divided them into two groups according to the approaches they adopt. The first group deals with studies concerning the “national theory of China.” I shall refer to it hereafter as the “national approach.” The second group of studies focuses on ethnic relationships among Korean-Chinese and other ethnic groups in China, hereafter referred to as the “ethnic approach.” Now I set forth to reveal a blind spot in those two approaches, meaning that while the former only looks at one side of the people of China, the latter survey places too much emphasis on ethnic relationships. On the one hand these two approaches can describe the state of the Korean-Chinese communities, but on the other hand they have difficulty explaining why the Korean-Chinese have formed and how both “national Chinese” and “ethnic Koreans” have been influenced by China.

In my attempt to provide answers to these questions, I propose a “global approach” from the viewpoint of historical capitalism: that is, the capitalist world economy as an interstate system. The “global approach,” which may be categorized as a third group in my study, is a new approach to examining the Korean-Chinese community. This methodology provides solutions to questions of why Korean settled in China and how they have become a Chinese people while maintaining their Korean ethnicity. The “global approach” allows us to know about the fundamental principles undergirding the formation of the Korean-Chinese community. Finally, the link between the formation of Korean-Chinese communities and the progress of historical capitalism will manifest new aspects of Korean-Chinese communities that have not yet been articulated.